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The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the 
global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the 
current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign 
debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and 
systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the 
sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration 
process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which 
made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. 
 
Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal 
governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member 
states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in 
adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument 
for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and 
credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large 
portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP 
ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining 
fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package 
of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal 
rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In 
other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong 
political commitment.1 
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1 The project has been conducted in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.1/B-09/1/KMR-2010-0005. 
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Introduction 
 
The Maastricht modification of the Rome Treaty made it undeniably clear that the euro 
project could become a successful endeavour only if member states were willing to refrain 
from fiscal laxity and non-sustainable debt accumulation. First, the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, and some years later the Stability and Growth Pact, aimed explicitly at achieving 
fiscal discipline by limiting both the deficit and the debt ratios of the general government (i.e., 
the annual deficit could not be higher than 3 per cent of the GDP, and the debt ratio should be 
below 60 per cent or declining towards the target ratio).2 Although the community-level 
numerical fiscal rules triggered continuous and tough debates in the European Union from the 
very beginning, member states became heavily engaged in adopting fiscal rules on the 
national level – that is, without any explicit or formal binding requirement induced by the 
Community itself. The motives for introducing national fiscal rules were numerous. Perhaps 
the most important one was the recognition that the obedience of the EU’s 3 and 60 per cent 
limits could be achieved only if it was supported by some other restricting national forces. In 
federal states it was the state/regional level where politicians wanted to induce fiscal 
discipline, whereas other member countries decided to adopt rules in order to find a solution 
to the permanent disequilibrium in social security systems, a problem that would cause even 
more trouble in the future due to the ageing of the population. Furthermore, there was a clear 
intention to scale down certain types of public expenditures, especially the ones paid to 
welfare provisions.  
The spread of adoption of national fiscal rules induced the Community to 
acknowledge this process explicitly in 2005, when a comprehensive reform of the Stability 
and Growth Pact was implemented. Accordingly, the Pact asked national rules to be in line 
with community-level disciplining forces. The Council of Economic and Finance Ministers 
(ECOFIN) went even further by endorsing national fiscal rules and asked member states to 
evaluate the effectiveness of their rules in their stability and convergence programmes, 
focusing especially on the adequateness of such national rules with Community-level goals 
(ECOFIN, 2005).  
One year later, national fiscal rules were discussed in depth in the annual report of the 
European Commission on public finances (EC, 2006). The report claimed that national rules 
were able to bolster fiscal discipline significantly and called for the adoption of rules in those 
                                                 
2 The Stability and Growth Pact, however, also claimed that member states must have achieved a close to 
balance or surplus position in their general budget in the medium run. 
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countries, too, where no such rules had previously existed.3 The Council, however, warned 
member states that the one-size-fits-all approach might have been harmful with regard to 
national rules; that is, every member state must have found the most appropriate disciplinary 
forces which could address the particular needs and problems of the specific country 
(ECOFIN, 2006).  
The 2007/2009 financial and economic crisis, however, has posed serious challenges 
for the whole architecture of the euro-zone. Besides the US, the EU has been the most 
severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand 
and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, 
constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not 
just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European 
integration process can be seriously undermined.  
At the start of the crisis, the European Union concentrated on crisis management 
almost exclusively and left the issue of crisis prevention untouched. It was only in 2010 when 
policymakers admitted that an ad hoc crisis management alone cannot guarantee the long-
term sustainability of the euro-zone. As a corollary, policy-makers, along with the European 
Commission, started working on a renewed crisis prevention pillar of the Union. The EU has 
embarked on a wide-scale reform with regard to its economic governance structures and 
policies. The need to strengthen rules-based fiscal policy has emerged as a widely shared 
consensus amongst policy-makers. One of the most important aims of the EU has become to 
increase the efficiency of governance. By now, member states do not seem to be reluctant 
anymore to give teeth to the Stability and Growth Pact by endorsing a more rigorous 
monitoring and sanctioning system. Importantly, sanctions would be imposed on countries 
that violate the rules automatically; that is, discretionary and politically motivated decisions 
would be reduced to a minimum in the future.  
Although most of the rules were suspended all over the world at the outburst of the 
current economic and financial crisis (IMF, 2009), the EU seems to insist on the usefulness of 
its national rules as one of the main devices in the exit process from Keynesian crisis 
management, i.e. fiscal profligacy. In its most recent report on the new economic governance 
structure, the European Commission claimed that national fiscal rules should have become an 
indispensible part of the new governing structure of the Economic and Monetary Union (EC, 
2010a). 
                                                 
3 These findings were endorsed three years later, too, by the European Commission. See EC (2009). 
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The scrutiny of EU fiscal rules such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact has become the focus of many scholarly debates both within and outside the 
Community. The study of national fiscal rules, however, has remained a neglected part of 
scholarly works. This paper tries to remedy this discrepancy and thus analyzes the country-
level fiscal rules of the EU. The aim is twofold: one the one hand, the paper wishes to 
discover the spread and significance of these rules in national legislation between 1990 and 
2007; on the other hand it also attempts to clarify the role these rules played in establishing 
fiscal discipline. Following a short introduction, the paper starts with an overview of the 
major theoretical explanations of deficit bias (permanent and high annual budget deficit). 
Next, national fiscal rules are investigated in detail in a comparative perspective. The last 
section demonstrates how national rules can provide an exit route from fiscal profligacy, a 
highly characteristic phenomenon throughout the whole European Union during the heydays 
of the most recent economic crisis.  
 
 
The political economy of deficit bias 
 
The declared goal of adopting fiscal rules is the establishment of fiscal discipline, the 
curtailment of excessive and discretionary spending activities driven by political rationality.4 
Fiscal rules are expected to constrain political decision-makers by restricting the scope for 
discretionary policies, thereby anchoring the expectations of not just voters but also market 
participants.  
Originally, rules were introduced in the context of monetary policy in the late 1970s.5 
Following the demise of Keynesian macroeconomic policy, rational expectation models 
claimed that it was rational for policy-makers to renege on their ex ante promises (i.e., low 
inflation) in order to bring about higher social welfare in the short run (in terms of higher 
inflation cum lower unemployment). Kydland and Prescott [1977] called this a time-
inconsistent decision. Time-inconsistency, however, is attached not only to monetary policy; 
it is an imminent feature of fiscal policy, too.  
                                                 
4 Fiscal rules are such legal or non-legal constraints on discretionary fiscal spending which have been defined in 
terms of certain fiscal aggregates. (See especially Kopits and Symansky, 1998). 
5 See especially the works of the late Milton Friedman, such as Friedman [1959]. 
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In political economy literature it is generally assumed that there is a tendency towards 
excessive spending (and deficit bias) in democratic societies. Deficit spending can become a 
persistent phenomenon because elected politicians face incentives which induce them to 
spend more (or tax less) than the socially optimal level. One of the earliest rationalisations of 
deficit bias claims that voters have to live together with several structural-institutional 
deficiencies, which make them unable to internalise the entire costs of their extra spending; 
that is, voters are not fully sensitive to the intertemporal budget constraint of the state. The 
source of such deficiencies can be indeed the government itself, which tries to manipulate the 
structure of both taxes and spending so that voters would overvalue the benefits of budgetary 
policies and/or undervalue its real costs. Accordingly, Buchanan and Wagner [1977] argued 
that fiscal illusion existed among voters. 
The costs and benefits of extra spending are, however, not necessarily distributed 
evenly amongst the members of a society. Transfers are paid to well-defined and targeted 
groups, whereas costs are burdened on the entire community of taxpayers. The discrepancy –
i.e., the common resource pool problem – between costs and benefits ends up in excessive and 
permanent deficit (Hagen, 1992). A distributional conflict can evolve, however, not only 
amongst geographical constituencies (Weingast et al., 1981) or line ministries (Stein et al., 
1999; Velasco, 1999) but also between generations: current generations can increase their 
consumption today by borrowing at the cost of future generations (Cukierman and Meltzer, 
1989).  
Debt can be manipulated in a strategic way, too, by the incumbent party in order to 
constrain the spending activities of the next government. The more likely the fall of the 
current government at the incoming elections, the more likely the strategic manipulation of 
the debt level (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990, and Persson and Svensson, 1989). Governments, 
however, may also find it beneficial to manipulate economic variables (including fiscal ones) 
in order to increase their chances of winning the next elections. Traditional political business 
cycle theory assumes myopic voters and adaptive expectations (Nordhaus, 1975), whereas 
rational expectations-based models assume the existence of asymmetric information with 
regard to the ability of the incumbents (Rogoff, 1990 or Shi and Svensson, 2002).  
Asymmetric information may prevail even within a coalition government if parties 
cannot agree on the share of costs of a fiscal consolidation. War-of-attrition models predict 
that consolidation evolves only if the marginal benefit of additional waiting for one coalition 
member becomes equal with the marginal cost of delaying reforms further (Alesina and 
Drazen, 1991).  
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The European Economic and Monetary Union has created a unique coordination 
problem by having established a supranational institution for the conduct of monetary policy 
and having left fiscal decisions in the hands of national governments. While the mandate of 
the independent European Central Bank is clear, i.e., to maintain price stability throughout the 
whole euro-zone (TFEU Article 127.), member states can manipulate their fiscal policies in 
the interest of their own constituencies. As a corollary, the clash of diverging interests gives 
birth to common resource problems in the euro-area.  
Assuming national currencies and flexible exchange rates, fiscal laxity would trigger a 
currency devaluation and a capital outflow. No such a disciplining force works, however, in 
case of a fixed exchange rate or in currency unions. The adoption of a single currency (such 
as the euro) strengthens the convergence of long-term interest rates (and government bond 
yields). Lowered interest rates in turn induce national governments to embark on further debt 
accumulation, thereby endangering the stability of the entire currency area. Thus, a common 
resource problem evolves as a consequence of cheaper deficit financing: spending 
governments expect other (disciplined) member states to finance the costs of their extra 
spending, which can surge to unsustainably high levels in times of an economic crisis. 6 
 
 
National fiscal rules in EU countries 
 
The comparative analysis of national fiscal rules covers the 27 member states of the EU, 
concentrating on the period between 1990 and 2004/2007, that is, before the outbreak of the 
recent economic and financial crisis.7 Data have been taken from the data base of the 
European Commission and the OECD (EC [2010b and 2010c], OECD [2009], and the 
AMECO database of the ECFIN). The analysis includes only those fiscal rules which have 
been adopted (1) on a national (or federal) level; (2) on a regional (state) level; (3) or in the 
                                                 
6 See the logic of the prisoners’ dilemma. The creation of a monetary union can strengthen deviant behaviour 
(i.e., deficit bias) even if participating states would run balanced budgets without a currency union (Detken et al., 
2004). 
7 Those fiscal rules were selected into the sample of this study which had been introduced until 2004. Delayed 
effects of fiscal rules were, however, detected until 2007, that is, just before the eruption of the 2008-2009 
financial and economic crisis. In some cases (especially in new member states), data were available for only the 
period following 1991/1992.  
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social security system. Accordingly, rules introduced on the local level have not been selected 
for the purpose of this study.  
Furthermore, the comparative analysis has been restricted to (1) debt rules, (2) balance 
budget (or deficit) rules, and (3) expenditure rules. Generally speaking, the primary aim of 
debt rules is to ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances in such a way that 
relative flexibility can still be maintained in the conduct of annual fiscal policy. Balanced-
budget rules are defined either in terms of some parts of the general budget, or they are 
applied for the whole general government. Although balanced budget rules are transparent 
and it is easy to monitor their compliance, they may also prove to be rather inflexible. It is 
quite often the case, therefore, that countries adopt balanced budget rules in cyclically 
adjusted forms. The drawback of this latter approach is, however, the complexity of the 
method of calculating the effects of business cycles appropriately.8 Expenditure rules are 
relatively recent. These rules provide an upper limit for various specific spending items of the 
budget.   
Based on the former restrictions, the 27 EU countries adopted fiscal rules on 39 
occasions between 1990 and 2004.9 Except for Greece, every single country decided to 
introduce rules in the group of the old member states (EU-15) – see Table 1. Finland and 
Luxembourg adopted rules the most frequently, on 4 occasions in total.10 The most attractive 
rule these countries had chosen to adopt was the balanced budget rule: 10 countries out of 15 
used them. Expenditure rules proved to be a frequent choice, too: 9 old member states 
operated with them. 11 
 
                                                 
8 Flexibility can also be strengthened by the adoption of the so-called golden rule, which prohibits deficit 
financing only for current expenditures. As such, public investment can still be financed out of debt. Golden 
rules were categorised in this sample as balanced budget rules. 
9 Some countries adopted fiscal rules well before 1990. These states were the following: Belgium (balanced 
budget rule), Luxembourg (debt rule), Germany (golden rule) and Spain (debt rule). 
10 Luxembourg decided to enact fiscal rules despite its incredibly low debt-to-GDP ratio, which remained below 
10 per cent in the period under scrutiny. 
11 While debt rules and deficit rules were adopted on the Community level (see the Maastricht criteria and the 
Stability and Growth Pact), no such a rule (i.e., expenditure rule) has been adopted yet on a supranational level.  
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Table 1. Fiscal rules in EU-15 (1990–2004) 
 
 Debt rule Balanced 
budget rule 
Expenditure 
rule 
Number of 
episodes 
Austria  1999, 2001  2 
Belgium  1992 1993, 1995 3 
Denmark  1992 1994 2 
Finland 1995 1999, 2003 1999 4 
France   1997, 1998 2 
Germany    – 
Greece    – 
Ireland   2000, 2004 2 
Italy  2001 1999, 2001 3 
Luxembourg  1992, 1993, 
1999 
1999 4 
Netherlands   1994 1 
Portugal  2002  1 
Spain 2003 2002  2 
Sweden  2000 1996 2 
UK 1997 1997  2 
Source: own compilation based on EC [2010c]. 
 
Old member states introduced rules mostly on a regional/state level in the early 
nineties. Later on, however, federal and national level rules (especially for the central budget 
and the social security system) became more widely used. Most rules were adopted in the 
context of the central government: its number (15) equalled the total amount of rules used for 
the general government, the social security system and the regions.  
Not only old member states, but also new ones decided to induce discipline in their 
public finance activities by institutionalising a rule-based regime. See Table 2 for details. The 
most active country was the Czech Republic, which adopted its first rules right after the 1997 
currency crisis. Yet, the most well-known rules were introduced by the Polish, who 
incorporated a debt rule even into their national constitution. The Polish fiscal rule has 
become an example to follow for some other new member states (such as Hungary and 
Bulgaria), as part of their exit strategy from the crisis.  
It is worth pinpointing that debt rules have become the least popular amongst old 
member states, whereas countries having joined the EU after 2004 used this type the most 
frequently. One explanation for such a difference is the fact that the Stability and Growth Pact 
made debt rule an integrated part of Community-level legislation, so these countries opted for 
other, mostly supplementary alternatives (expenditure rules for instance). Another 
distinguishing feature of the group of new member states has been that these countries 
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adopted rules with a much wider coverage; basically, the whole general government fell under 
control.12 
 
Table 2. Fiscal rules in EU-12 (1990–2004) 
 
 Debt rule Balanced 
budget rule 
Expenditure 
rule 
Number of 
episodes 
Bulgaria 2003   1 
Cyprus    – 
Czech Republic 1998, 2004   2 
Estonia  1993  1 
Hungary    – 
Latvia    – 
Lithuania 1997   1 
Malta    – 
Poland 1997   1 
Romania    – 
Slovakia 2002  2002 2 
Slovenia 2000   1 
Source: own compilation based on EC [2010c]. 
 
According to political economy arguments, the main motive for the adoption of fiscal 
rules is the hope for strengthening fiscal discipline by anchoring the expectations of rational 
agents. One way to proxy fiscal discipline is to measure the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio 
(see for instance EC, 2006). In contrast to the annual budget deficit, the size of debt and 
especially the dynamics of its change (i.e., the speed of acceleration) have a direct impact on 
the future potential growth rate of an economy. The accumulation of debt can significantly 
add to the future tax burden of individuals (Barro, 1979), and also it reduces readiness to 
invest (Baldacci and Kumar, 2010).13  
In the period under investigation, the debt-to-GDP ratio declined by an annual 0.5 per 
cent (of the GDP) on average in EU-27 – independently from the fact whether a fiscal rule 
was introduced or not.14 Two explanations can be given for this somewhat surprising 
observation. The general explanation is that from the very early nineties onwards, inflationary 
                                                 
12 The only exceptions were Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where rules covered the regional governments  
13 Reinhart and Rogoff [2010] found that an annual growth deficit of 2.5 per cent emerged between countries of 
low debt ratios (below 30 per cent of the GDP) and high ratios (above 90 per cent). Kumar and Woo [2010] 
added that a 10 percentage point increase (in GDP) of public debt lowers economic growth by 0.2 per cent on 
average. This effect is more significant in emerging and developing countries due to their higher cost of debt 
financing.  
14 Standard deviation, however, was relatively high in the population of EU countries: 4.0 
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bias was significantly curbed and a stable economic growth was initiated in both the 
developed and the developing parts of the world. The two-decade-long period was termed as 
the Great Moderation in the literature (Csaba, 2010). A more specific explanation is provided, 
however, by the EU itself. Member states showed a strong dedication to fiscal consolidation 
in the nineties as part of their qualification attempts to enter the euro-zone. The lowering of 
the debt ratio was fuelled by different sources, therefore: (1) by accelerated economic growth, 
(2) by lowered (real) interest rates, and (3) by recovery in the primary general government 
balance. 
 
Table 3. Change in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the whole population and the sample of 
countries with fiscal rules 
 
 Change after one year Change after 3 years 
Entire population (N=364) -0.5 
(4.0) 
-1.4 
(9.7) 
Fiscal rules (n=33) -0.8 
(3.3) 
-3.9 
(6.7) 
Source: own compilation. 
Notes: Changes are as per cent of the GDP. Standard deviation in brackets. The number of fiscal rule episodes 
dropped to 33 from the original 39 because some countries introduced two different types of rules in the same 
year.) 
 
In fact, four countries in the group of EU-15 achieved a two-digit number 
improvement in their debt-to-GDP ratios: these were Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Sweden (see Table 4.). Ireland (which experienced a dramatic drop of 68 percentage points) 
and Spain produced also a negative debt dynamic, but the 2008-2009 crisis caused severe 
challenges with regard to the sustainability of public finances. A further group of old member 
states (Austria, Finland, Luxembourg and the UK) could increase their indebtedness without 
violating the 60 per cent limit set up in the Stability and Growth Pact. Only 5 countries – 
France, Greece, Germany, Italy and Portugal – did not abide by the community-level debt-
rule and accumulated debt on a permanent basis. That is, these five countries entered the crisis 
with an already high debt ratio, which significantly narrowed the room for fiscal laxity as a 
possible cure of losses in economic output and employment. Table 4 convincingly informs 
that the emergence of a kind of reform fatigue (see Briotti, 2004) was hardly the case for the 
whole European Union. Only a few countries embarked on lax policies after the launch of the 
EMU project in 1999. Countries which successfully managed to lower their debt ratios 
achieved their best results in 2006 and 2007; that is, well after the start of the EMU project 
and just before the eruption of the current economic crisis.  
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Table 4. Changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio in EU-15 countries (1990–2007) 
 
 1990 Minimum* 2007 Change 
(1990–2007) 
Group A     
Belgium 125.7 84.2 (2007) 84.2 –41.5 
Denmark 62.0 26.8 (2007) 26.8 –35.2 
Netherlands 76.8 45.5 (2007) 45.5 –31.3 
Sweden 72.4** 40.5 (2007) 40.5 –31.9 
 
Group B 
    
Ireland 93.2 25.0 (2006) 25.1 –68.1 
Spain 42.6 36.1 (2007) 36.1 –6.5 
 
Group C 
    
Austria 56.1 56.1 (1990) 59.5 +3.4 
Finland 14.0 14.0 (1990) 35.2 +21.2 
Luxembourg 4.7 4.1 (1991) 6.6 +1.9 
UK 33.3 33.3 (1990) 44.2 +10.9 
 
Group D 
    
France 35.2 35.2 (1990) 63.8 +28.6 
Greece 71.0 71.0 (1990) 95.6 +24.6 
Germany 39.5 39.5 (1990) 65.0 +25.5 
Italy 94.7 94.7 (1990) 103.5 +8.8 
Portugal 55.0 50.4 (2000) 63.6 +8.6 
Remark:  *The year in which the minimum ratio was achieved is in brackets. ** data as of 1994. Data are as per 
cent of the GDP. 
Source: own compilation based on EC [2010b]. 
 
Debt ratios posed a real challenge only for a few countries amongst new member 
states. Relatively high debt ratios were mostly not the direct result of the transformation 
process itself. Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria had suffered from huge indebtedness under 
communist rule already. One of the most relevant challenges for these three countries was 
therefore to turn back the upward trend of indebtedness. Bulgaria embarked on a drastic 
consolidation after 1997, by which the country was able to reduce its debt level from over 100 
per cent to below 20 per cent Poland and Hungary initiated also ambitious adjustment 
programmes, which did bring about some results. Hungary, however, returned to deficit 
financing and debt accumulation in the new millennium again and entered the period of the 
recent crisis with a debt level higher than the Maastricht criteria. The crisis made the situation 
even worse and the Hungarian debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at 81 per cent by 2010. 
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Table 5. Changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio in EU-12 countries (1990–2007) 
 
 In the starting 
year 
Minimum 2007 Change 
(Starting year–
2007) 
Group A     
Bulgaria 105.1 (1997) 18.2 (2007) 18.2 –86.9 
Estonia 9.0 (1994) 3.8 (2007) 3.8 –5.2 
Latvia 13.9 (1996) 9.0 (2007) 9.0 –4.9 
Romania 16.5 (1997) 12.4 (2006) 12.6 –3.9 
 
Group B 
    
Hungary 86.2 (1995) 52.0 (2001) 65.9 –20.3 
 
Group C 
    
Cyprus 50.2 (1996) 50.2 (1996) 58.3 +8.1 
Czech Republic 14.6 (1994) 12.5 (1996) 29.0 +14.4 
Poland 43.4 (1996) 36.8 (2000) 45.0 +1.6 
Lithuania 11.5 (1995) 11.5 (1995) 16.9 +5.4 
Slovakia 22.2 (1995) 22.2 (1995) 29.3 +7.1 
Slovenia 20.4 (1996) 20.4 (1996) 23.3 +2.9 
 
Group D 
    
Malta 39.0 (1996) 39.0 (1996) 62.0 +23.0 
Remark: Data are as per cent of the GDP. 
Source: own compilation based on EC [2010b]. 
 
The first lesson that can be drawn form the above scrutiny is therefore that establishing 
and/or strengthening fiscal discipline was by and large a general tendency in both new and old 
EU countries, irrespective of the fact whether it was facilitated by rules or not. Yet, countries 
which decided to support their efforts in pursuing fiscal discipline by fiscal rules were on 
average more successful than the whole population of EU-27. Debt-to-GDP ratio declined by 
0.8 percentage point on average right after the introduction of the rule (standard deviation was 
however quite large: 3.3) in the sample of states with a rule as opposed to 0.5 per cent for the 
whole population. The cumulative effect of fiscal rules was even more substantial in the third 
year: the decline reached 3.9 percentage points on average (st. deviation: 6.7), which was 
more than 2.5 times higher than the decline in the entire population (1.5 percentage point). 
(Note that the data have been provided in Table 3.) It seems, therefore, that rules might have 
exerted a positive effect on fiscal performance of EU countries. 
Yet, an assumed positive correlation between the introduction of fiscal rules on the 
one hand and improved fiscal discipline on the other hand does not signal the exact direction 
of such a relation. It might be that rules pave the way for fiscal discipline, but it might also be 
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the case that disciplined governments adopt rules in order to demonstrate their political 
commitments. This second hypothesis was supported by some evidence in EU countries, too. 
In fact, in half of the observed cases, the decline in the debt-to-GDP ratios was quite 
substantial already before the adoption of fiscal rule (i.e., in year t-1). Moreover, one-third of 
the cases showed a significant drop in the preceding three years; these episodes were the 
following: Bulgaria (2003), Finland (1999), Ireland (2000 and 2004), Italy (1999 and 2001), 
Sweden (2000) and Spain (2002 and 2003).15 (Details are reported in Figure 1.)  
 
Figure 1. The change in gross public debt as compared to the year of rule adoption 
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Spain (2002)
EU-27 (1990-2004)
 
Notes: The change in the debt-to-GDP ratios is zero in year t, time of the adoption of rules. The straight line 
labelled EU-27 (1990–2004) displays the change of the entire population as a benchmark (note that the annual 
average decline was 0.5 per cent of the GDP): 
Source: own editing. 
 
Accordingly, a sizeable group of countries decided to adopt rules only after their 
governments initiated improving measures in the general government. The question is, 
therefore, whether it was due to improved external conditions, such as increased economic 
growth (i.e., allowing countries to grow out of debt) or whether it was the decisive step of 
                                                 
15 Belgium (1995) and Slovakia (2002) experienced a significant drop in their debt ratios two years ahead of the 
introduction of their specific rules.  
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incumbents to consolidate the general budget or its parts. The results do not point into one 
direction, however. Some countries such as Ireland strongly benefited from high economic 
growth. Italy and Bulgaria initiated reforms mostly on the revenue side of the budget by 
increasing marginal tax rates and the tax base. Finland and Sweden, however, concentrated 
their adjustment efforts mostly on the expenditure side of the general budget. The Nordic 
countries cut back welfare subsidies and the salaries paid to the public sector substantially. 
Ireland had a special status not just with regard to the strong growth-effects but also because it 
adopted serious structural reforms, focusing mostly on the labour market. 
The only common feature of these “successful” episodes was the substantial recovery 
in the interest payments. The drop in interest payments could not, however, be linked directly 
to the adoption of fiscal rules. Instead, a kind of Maastricht effect could be identified, that is, 
the process of changeover to the euro induced a relatively solid decline in the risk premia paid 
on treasury bonds in these countries. A summary of consolidation efforts focusing on the 
expenditure side is provided in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Changes in public spending before the adoption of fiscal rule(s) 
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?– –  ??– – – – ? – ? ?– – – ?? ??? 
Finland 
1999 
??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? – ?? 
Ireland 2000 ??? ??? ?– – ??? 
 
??? ??? ??– 
Ireland 2004 – – – –?– – – – – – – – – – ??? – ?? 
Italy 1999 – ? – ?– – –?– –?– – – – ??? – – – 
Italy 2001 – – –  – – – – – – – ?? – ? – ??– –?– 
Sweden 
2000 
– ?? ? – ? – ?? ??? ??? ??? – – ? 
Spain 2002 – – – – – ? –?– ??– ??? ??? ?– – 
Spain 2003 – – – –?– ?– – ? – ? ??– ??? – – – 
Notes:  
?: a decline in the specific spending item (measured in GDP), 
–: an increase or stagnation in the specific spending item (measured in GDP). 
The first symbol refers to changes in period between (t–3) and (t–2), the second one displays the change between 
(t–2) and (t–1), whereas the last symbol refers to a change from (t–1) to t. 
Source: own compilation based on AMECO data base. 
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The European Commission has compiled a solid data set which enables us to qualify 
the strength of fiscal rules in a comparative manner. The strength is measured by a composite 
index encapsulating all the relevant qualitative features of rules such as the statutory base, the 
monitoring and enforcement body, the coverage, the sanctions, etc. Based on the EC (2010c) 
data set, it can be safely claimed that fiscal discipline (proxied by the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance of the general government) and the strength of rules display a robust and 
statistically significant correlation (the correlation coefficient is 0.43 in Figure 2). As a 
corollary, a further lesson that can be drawn from the EU-27 sample is the following: it is not 
simply the adoption of a rule that may contribute to fiscal discipline, but rather the design 
(i.e., the strength) of the particular fiscal rule. The best-performing countries with regard to 
the strength of fiscal rules are the ones which were also named in the previous section, that is, 
Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Denmark. 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between the strength of fiscal rules and primary balances 
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Note: : The average of standardised fiscal rules index (between 2003 and 2007) are highlighted on the vertical 
axis, whereas cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) averages (between 2003 and 2007) have been plotted 
against the horizontal axis. 
Source: own compilation based on EC (2010b and 2010c). 
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The role of fiscal rules in exit strategies 
 
The 2007/2009 financial and economic crisis caused severe damages in advanced countries, 
which responded to the drop in economic activity by accumulating an accelerated aggregate 
demand from public sources.16 Crisis management, therefore, significantly contributed to the 
building up of unsustainable debt ratios. According to the IMF [2010a], the crisis itself and 
the crisis management (inclusive of bail outs of part of the banking sector) would increase 
advanced countries’ debt ratios by 36 percentage points on average between 2007 and 2014. 
What this means is that the average debt-to-GDP ratio would climb above 110 per cent by 
2015. The record-high levels can prove to be damaging to potential growth rates of these 
countries, which, however, may be lowered by 0.5 per cent of the GDP on average (IMF 
[2010b]). 
The recovery from the crisis should induce countries to implement economic policies 
which not simply stop further deficit financing and debt accumulation, but also restore the 
long-term competitiveness and sustainability of the crisis-hit countries. The already high level 
of income centralisation does not allow advanced countries (especially the ones in the 
European Union) to further increase marginal tax ratios because this would endanger 
competitiveness of their economies on a world-wide scale. Crisis management, however, was 
pursued not by the lowering of taxes. Instead, governments engaged in extra public spending. 
Thus, exit from the crisis should concentrate on the expenditure side of the general budget, 
too. It is high time, however, for advanced countries to initiate consolidation efforts in a more 
systematic way than it has been previously carried out. No across-the-board type cuttings 
would contribute to the sustainability of economic growth in these countries. Targeted and 
well-designed adjustment efforts should be implemented instead, targeting areas such as the 
pension system, the health care system or public administration.17 
                                                 
16 In addition, monetary authorities adopted accommodative policies by reducing official interest rates to zero or 
close to zero.  
17 The challenge of the aging population will pose an enormous trouble for EU countries in the next decades. If 
nothing is to change, age-related expenditures could increase automatically by 4 to 5 per cent of the GDP after 
2020 (IMF [2010a]). According to the (ECB [2010], the most severe problems would emerge in Greece (where 
an estimated 15.9 per cent of GDP increase is expected in public spending), Slovenia (12.8), Cyprus (10.8) and 
Malta (10.2). 
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According to the most recent plans of the European Commission and the European 
Council,18 fiscal rules can play a significant role in the exit process from the crisis by re-
establishing fiscal discipline and putting an end to further debt accumulation. As it has been 
shown in this paper, fiscal rules may indeed contribute to the creation and maintenance of 
fiscal discipline, but the commitment of national governments to fiscal sustainability is 
probably even more important than the rules themselves. Just as the Maastricht process 
throughout the nineties (i.e., the qualification for euro-zone membership) helped politicians to 
demonstrate their willingness to refrain from unnecessary and destabilising discretionary 
deficit financing, the current financial and economic crisis may provide another window of 
opportunity for troubled countries to engage in comprehensive reforms of their general 
budget, thereby strengthening the position of the European Union on a global scale. Such an 
engagement can be supported by the adoption of well-designed fiscal rules, which would 
anchor the expectation of both voters and market agents. The supranational rules-based 
economic governance system supplemented by national fiscal rules, embedded in a medium-
term fiscal framework, and a more enhanced and capable national system of statistical and 
monitoring offices can become integrated elements of not just the exit strategies but also a 
future-oriented governance structure.  
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